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Ethnicity and conflict severity. Accounting for the effect of co-ethnic and 
non-ethnic militias on battlefield lethality 
 
Huseyn Aliyev and Emil A. Souleimanov 
 
Forthcoming in Third World Quarterly 
 
Abstract: How does the presence of armed pro-regime groups affect conflict lethality? 
This study examines the relationship between ethnicity, militia violence and conflict 
lethality in civil wars. We emphasise that differences in whether pro-regime militias 
were recruited in accordance with their ethnicity or not are critical in their influence 
upon conflict lethality, which we estimate in battlefield deaths. To that end, we 
categorise militias into groups recruited on their ethnic basis (co-ethnic militias) and 
those recruited regardless of their ethnicity (non-ethnic militias). We hypothesise that 
conflicts are more lethal when non-ethnic militias are involved. We link higher numbers 
of battle-deaths in conflicts with non-ethnic militias with the militia use of one-sided 
violence against civilians. Co-ethnic militias – that is militias recruited from the same 
ethnicity as rebels – are deployed amongst their co-ethnics and therefore tend to target 
civilians less than non-ethnic militias. This militia-civilian relationship has direct 
impact on conflict severity. To test our hypotheses we conduct global statistical analysis 
of 84 intrastate conflicts from 1989 to 2014.  
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Introduction  
 
Since the start of Cold War, pro-government militias
1 were involved in over 80% of intrastate conflicts2. Militias function not only as top-tier 
violent non-state actors involved in civil conflicts, but they also on many occasions have 
military capacities and material potential parallel to the state.3 However, the impact of such 
violent non-state actors as militias on civil war dynamics differs vastly from one episode of 
civil warfare to another. For instance, in the ongoing intrastate conflict in Yemen, the pro-
regime Popular Committees operate as a key government force fighting against the Houthi 
rebels. A similar situation occurs in Iraq, where Shia volunteer brigades (al-Hashed al-
Sha’bi) were deployed heavily during the Ramadi, Fallujah and Mosul offensives, both 
alongside and often instead of the regular army. By contrast, the role of PGMs in other 
conflicts, such as Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram, India’s counterinsurgency against 
Naxalites, or the Philippines’ conflict with Abu-Sayyaf has been marginal.  
 Since the term ‘pro-government militias’ refers to a vast diversity of quasi-state armed 
actors, not only divided in terms of their organisational dimension, such as formal and 
informal militias, but also with regard to their ethnic composition, the effect of different types 
of PGMs on conflict dynamics is filtered through a diversity of factors. State capacity, 
military strength and the political will, have been rehearsed in the literature as key 
determinants of militias’ role in armed conflicts.4 The effect of ethnicity on militia 
performance occasionally emerged in research on civil wars.5 Existing research on militias in 
armed conflicts has argued that militias recruited from the same ethnicity as rebels – due to 
their embeddedness in the local context6 – tend to be more efficient counterinsurgents than 
other types of militias. They also were found to be less willing to persecute co-ethnic 
civilians7 and less prone to rely on extreme forms of violence.8 Notwithstanding these 
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findings, the research to-date has tended to disregard the role of ethnicity in the militias’ 
effect on conflict escalation, intensity and lethality. Theoretical explanations of how, when 
and under which conditions ethnicity comes into effect with militia performance, and 
particularly the capacity of pro-government proxies to influence conflict intensification, are 
notable by their absence. Providing a theoretical and empirical account on the  effect of 
militias’ ethnicity on conflict lethality would shed light on conflict escalation factors and the 
global patterns of the non-state actors’ role in civil wars. In order to provide answers to the 
above puzzles, we conduct global statistical analysis of the militia involvement in 84 civil 
wars from 1989 to 2014.  
We define as co-ethnic militias PGMs involved in a conflict between two or more 
ethnic groups, where co-ethnic militias are recruited by the government from the same ethnic 
group(s) as rebels and deployed to promote interests of the incumbent. Hence, co-ethnic 
PGMs are present only in ethnic conflicts – that is civil wars fought over ethnic grievances – 
because they were assembled in accordance with their ethnicity and in order to enable the 
government to benefit from ethnic ties of militias when deployed against their co-ethnics. Co-
ethnic militias’ key advantage is their ethnic embeddedness in rebel constituency, which 
might provide the government with unique access to intelligence and insider support from 
otherwise hostile ethnic group(s). Owing to this advantage of co-ethnic PGMs, they are 
deployed exclusively amongst their co-ethnics. Typical examples of co-ethnic militias are 
Kurdish Village Guards participating in Turkey’s conflict with the PKK, Chechen kadyrovtsy 
in Russia’s conflict with Chechen separatists, as well as Sri Lanka’s anti-LTTE Green Tigers 
and Black Cats militias.9 Along with many other similar militia organisations, these groups 
were recruited exclusively from rebel co-ethnics and were deployed by incumbents to serve 
amongst their own ethnic groups.  
 4 
By contrast, militias recruited from other ethnic groups than rebels, or mobilised 
regardless of their ethnicity, are defined as non-ethnic PGMs. Non-ethnic militias might be 
deployed both in ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts. In ethnic conflicts, non-ethnic PGMs are 
often mobilised against ethnic groups other than their own. For instance, Serb militias in 
Yugoslav wars were used to attack other ethnicities. We describe such PGMs as non-ethnic 
because the key purpose of such organisations is to support the regime regardless of its ethnic 
makeup. One example of non-ethnic PGMs engaged in ethnic conflicts is Ukraine’s volunteer 
battalions, which were recruited regardless of their ethnicity and enlist into their ranks, apart 
from Ukrainians, also Ukraine’s ethnic Jews, Crimean Tartars and Georgians.10   
This study hypothesises that the participation of co-ethnic and non-ethnic militias has 
notable effect on conflict severity, as defined by battlefield lethality. On the one hand, we 
argue that non-ethnic militias are more likely to function as ruthless pro-regime ‘enforcers’ 
deploying excessive violence in their efforts to physically eliminate the incumbent’s 
opponents, and, therefore, are more conducive to higher lethality than co-ethnic pro-regime 
groups. On the other hand, this article posits that due co-ethnic militias’ efforts to avoid 
attacking their fellow co-ethnics, they are likely to lead to lower battlefield lethality. We 
emphasise the critical role of one-sided violence, or the violence against civilians, that 
determines the patterns of militia violence and, most of all, militias’ impact on battlefield 
lethality in intrastate conflicts. The key theoretical argument is that the difference between 
how co-ethnic and non-ethnic militias influence deaths on the battlefield is filtered through 
their use of one-sided violence against civilians. Our hypotheses are tested by Cox 
proportional hazards models, which validate our claims demonstrating that co-ethnic militias 
tend to be less lethal than non-ethnic PGMs.  
This article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we examine existing literature on 
pro-government militias in civil wars. The following section will lay out our hypotheses and 
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present the theoretical argument in details. Next, a section on data and methods will discuss 
the dataset and explain the statistical models. Then, we present and analyse the empirical 
findings and consider probable alternative explanations. In the concluding section, we 
summarise our findings and describe possible avenues for future research and practice.          
 
‘Informal proxies’: pro-government militias in civil wars  
 
The role of PGMs in civil wars has been described as one of the key factors accounting for 
escalation of conflict-related violence.11 A statistical estimate reveals that there is a 53% 
likelihood that a government can suppress an insurgency if it deploys a PGM12. Mitchell et 
al.13 estimated that since 1989, as many as 60 countries employed PGMs in various 
counterinsurgency tasks. A growing number of studies confirmed that a presence of militias 
significantly increases government’s capacity to spiral the violence. Research on PGMs’ 
involvement in genocide, civilian targeting, human rights violations, mass killings and sexual 
violence demonstrated that PGMs significantly contribute to each of these types of conflict-
associated violence.14 Many of these studies have argued that PGMs were indispensable for 
governments in orchestrating repressions and persecuting dissent. The use of selective 
violence exercised by PGMs ‘may in fact reduce the level of active popular support for the 
opposition, at least temporarily,’15 antagonising parts of the population from the local 
insurgency. It has also been argued that the presence of PGMs can potentially ‘increase the 
length of civil wars.’16 However, the relationship between civil wars and militias is mutually 
reinforcing.17 Not only PGMs impact the course and intensity of a civil war, but also the 
existence of a civil conflict is fundamental for the emergence and proliferation of pro-
government militias. For instance, as found by Kalyvas18 in his study of civil violence in the 
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1940s Greece, the key factor behind the appearance of militias was presence of insurgent 
violence and the incumbent’s attempts to curb it.  
 The functioning of PGMs in civil wars, however, still ‘is a neglected variable’19 in 
research on militia violence. Despite the presence of PGMs in most episodes of civil warfare 
over the past several decades, research on militias has thus far been mostly case-driven.20 The 
empirical work on militias is abundant with numerous case study-based analyses. More 
recently, a growing body of case studies began filling the gap in understudied theoretical 
aspects of militia violence.21 Whilst some of these studies are comparative, most are dealing 
with a single case study. The bulk of existing theoretical studies on militias tend to explore 
functional and structural characteristics of militias through the lenses of their relationship 
with the state. Staniland22 presents the militia-state dichotomy as engraved in state’s 
strategies towards militias. These strategies are suppression, containment, collusion and 
incorporation. He proposes that the state’s attitude towards militias is ideologically embedded 
in the government’s perception of militias as either positive (superfluous supporters, strange 
bedfellows, armed allies and business partners) or negative (mortal enemies or undesirables) 
institutions.23 A number of studies have sought to explain the emergence of PGMs and their 
development and transformation throughout the course of a conflict.24 Whilst some argued in 
favour of rationalist and functionalist approaches,25 others presented their case in support of 
structural and historical explanations.26 In the words of Campbell and Brenner,27 the reliance 
on militias ‘lies in the need of state to deny that they breaking the established norms of 
behaviour.’ The use of PGM in counterinsurgency allows foreign principals legitimising their 
actions amongst the population.  
The research has demonstrated that governments create militias not only to outsource 
violence or to tackle issues of accountability for violence, but also to reduce the costs of 
counterinsurgency and to increase its efficiency.28 The PGMs’ unique capacities of 
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intelligence gathering and the access to local knowledge have been observed on numerous 
occasions.29 Another advantage of using militias is that militia casualties are usually counted 
as civilian victims, which further demonises rebels in the eyes of the population and 
legitimises counterinsurgency. 30  
Notwithstanding the extant body of literature on militias, no efforts were made thus far 
to estimate the effect of PGMs on conflict lethality, or to link militias’ ethnicity with battle-
deaths. Since most of research on the relationship between militias’ ethnicity and one-sided 
violence consists of single-case studies,31 little is known about the effect of (non)ethnic 
militias on one-sided violence and how this relationship influences battle-deaths on a global 
scale. This article contributes to the growing body of literature on pro-government militias by 
exploring an important but thus far understudied aspect of militia organisations: the impact of 
ethnicity on conflict severity.   
 
Non-ethnic PGMs and battlefield lethality in civil wars 
 
Unlike co-ethnic PGMs, non-ethnic PGMs stand outside the fabric of local societies. Being 
outsiders – even if they emanate from the same area – usually renders non-ethnic PGMs 
exempt from ethnically-shaped clan and family ties.32 Since they may have less in-group 
solidarity with the locals, makes non-ethnic PGMs similar to non-ethnic conventional forces. 
In turn, disconnection from the local population is likely to reduce access to important 
information on the ground as the locals may be less willing,33 on the basis of the absent in-
group networks, to provide intelligence to non-ethnic PGMs as opposed to ethnic PGMs.34 To 
sum up, the lack of in-group solidarity, coupled with key information problem – inability and 
unwillingness to differentiate between combatants and their supporters on the one hand, and 
non-combatants on the other hand –  may increase the willingness on the side of non-ethnic 
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PGMs to deploy excessive violence.35 In addition, it is well-known in the literature that the 
knowledge of local customs, grievances, and social dynamics – present in the case of ethnic 
PGMs and absent in the case of non-ethnic PGMs and non-ethnic conventional forces – are 
salient for success in counterinsurgency.36  
 Importantly, existing research shows that many PGMs are almost exclusively 
recruited by the promise of material gains, as well as by the incumbent-imposed impunity to 
retaliate, rape, kill, etc.37 Grievance-driven retaliation is known to be an important source of 
recruitment into insurgent groups.38 In honorific societies, where many contemporary 
insurgencies and civil wars have been fought, the deeply embedded honour-centred code of 
retaliation amplifies this disconnection between the local population and non-ethnic PGMs. 
Non-ethnic PGMs, unlike ethnic PGMs, are more likely to originate from distant areas.39 
Unlike ethnic PGMs, non-ethnic PGMs and their relatives are thus harder to identify, localise, 
and retributively target by the avengers from amongst the local population. This, in turn, may 
be a contributing factor to the wider use of excessive and lethal violence by non-ethnic PGMs 
who are not to take into consideration retributive violence at the hands of locals. 
 In some cases, ‘age-old ethnic hatred’ between ethnic communities may play an 
important role. In fact, non-ethnic PGMs are often recruited from feuding ethnic populations, 
usually neighbours and rivals with a history of mutual hostilities. Non-ethnic PGMs may thus 
be willing to engage in conflict for the sake of retaliation, in continuation of ethnic 
antagonism, and so on. For instance, the Sudanese ethnic-Arab Janjaweed militias run by 
Khartoum have mainly attacked Darfur’s non-Arab populations. The recent history knows 
plenty of cases of colonial powers recruiting non-ethnic PGMs to deploy against other-ethnic 
rebel groups, for instance, the British deployment of Assyrian PGMs in the Arab-majority 
Iraq in the 1930s.40 Even when the underlying ethnic antagonism is not the case at the onset 
of the deployment of non-ethnic PGMs, their very presence in a conflict environment may 
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generate conflict along ethnic lines. As Sabine C. Carey and Neil J. Mitchell41 have observed, 
‘ethnically defined militias may polarize ethnic groups, which creates long-term mistrust that 
further complicates post-conflict reconciliation.’ For instance, in Congo-Brazzaville of the 
1990s, three presidential candidates with various ethnic backgrounds created militia units, all 
made up of fighters from their respective ethnic groups. These non-ethnic PGMs were 
deployed in combat against their ethnic adversaries, both civilian and combatant, which 
ultimately contributed to deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in this African nation.42 
Likewise, Nigeria’s Civilian Joint Task Force, a vigilante multi-ethnic group heavily 
deployed by Abuja against the Kanuri-dominated Boko Haram, Salafi-jihadist group, has 
increasingly assumed anti-Kanuri overtones.  
 Ethnically-conditioned violence is likely to be more excessive turning sways of the 
local population, just because of their ancestry, into potential targets. This, too, may increase 
the lethality of violence used by non-ethnic PGMs. Whilst the ultimate goal of PGMs is to 
undermine civilian support for insurgents, their excessive and lethal attacks may in the end be 
counterproductive in pitching the local population against counterinsurgency. Noteworthy, 
violence perpetrated by members of an ethnically distinct community may polarise both non-
ethnic forces and the local population, making the latter put up stiff resistance to the former 
as the thrust of the Pashtun-dominated Taliban into Afghanistan’s non-Pashtun areas 
illustrated.43  
 Excessive and highly lethal attacks carried out by non-ethnic PGMs may increase  the 
pressure on the rebels to weigh in to defend their ethnic kin by counterattacking 
counterinsurgents, government troops, non-ethnic PGMs, and possibly also their alleged 
supporters and the collaborators from amongst the local populations. For instance, Taliban’s 
invasion into non-Pashtun parts of Afghanistan in the late 1990s urged Tajik, Hazara and 
Uzbek-dominated areas to consolidate along ethnic lines to resist the invader, all despite 
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Taliban’s efforts to present itself as a supra-regional group in the service of the country’s 
Sunni Muslims.44 Thus, being forced to protect their civilian support base, rebels may 
increase the overall level of violence, which results in higher battlefield lethality. Similar case 
had been reported during Colombia’s civil war when encroachment by right-wing AUC 
paramilitaries on ELN support areas forced guerrillas to step up their attacks on perceived 
pro-regime targets.45 When seeking to protect their civilian support bases from pro-regime 
harassment, rebels may not necessarily succeed in inflicting higher casualties on government 
forces and PGMs, but may instead lose higher numbers of their own fighters. Therefore, 
appearance of non-ethnic militias on the battleground might affect conflict lethality not only 
directly through militia violence against enemy combatants and civilians, but also indirectly 
by forcing insurgents to protect their support bases. Hence, we arrive at our first hypothesis, 
namely:  
Hypothesis 1: Civil wars involving non-ethnic militias are more likely to 
have higher lethality than conflicts with co-ethnic militias.  
 
Co-ethnic PGMs and battlefield lethality in civil wars 
 
Being embedded in the local society, with a range of extended networks, co-ethnic PGMs 
have access to information on the ground which enables them to differentiate between the 
‘guilty’ and ‘non-guilty.’ This makes the task of selective targeting – the key to successful 
counterinsurgency – easier for co-ethnic PGMs, contrary to non-ethnic PGMs or conventional 
non-ethnic forces.46 In fact, Peic47 shows that recruiting local ethnic militia units for the sake 
of intelligence is the major task for counterinsurgent forces. Kalyvas48 illustrates that locally 
recruited ethnic PGMs, for example, in Kenya or Algeria in the 1950s and or in Iraq in the 
2000s, produce intelligence that conventional forces are less capable of producing. At the 
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onset of the Second Chechnya war, the locals were unwilling to share information with 
Russian troops seen as ethnically alien and unrelated to the locals by means of ethnicity and 
kinship. It was only after the gradual deployment of pro-Moscow Chechen paramilitaries, 
kadyrovtsy, that part of the local population, usually cognate with co-ethnic PGMs, started 
providing crucial support and information to ethnic-Chechen counterinsurgents.49 
 Ethnic PGMs usually refrain from engaging in violence for the sake of violence per se 
in that they seek to not antagonise the whole of the local population made up of their fellow 
ethnics. In fact, ethnic PGMs rely – at least partially – on some form of local support, 
particularly of their families and supporters, which makes them less willing to deploy 
excessive violence than non-ethnic PGMs.50 Therefore, ethnic PGMs tend to avoid civilian 
persecution in the midst of their co-ethnics. In other words, civilians are not persecuted only 
on the basis of their ethnic background.51 Ethnic PGMs usually operate in armed conflicts 
with blurred fault-lines, holding the sympathies of part of the local population, in contrast to 
polarised inter-ethnic conflicts in which non-ethnic PGMs are deployed. Unlike non-ethnic 
PGMs, ‘ethnic hatred’ is not what drives the violence of PGMs, although some family, clan, 
or subethnic animosities may still be present.  
 In addition, to resist co-ethnic militias, rebels need to have the ability to identify their 
targets more selectively. They need specific intelligence that can be obtained through their 
ethnic networks. Since militias often belong to the same ethnic group, targeting on both sides 
becomes less lethal. For example, in Russia’s Dagestan, insurgents usually refrained from 
large-scale targeting in their ethnic areas out of fear of antagonising their ethnic kin and 
fellow clan and family members. Instead, they preferred to strike in areas populated by 
members of other ethnic groups.52 When confronted by ethnic militias, rebels tend to target 
civilians more selectively – choosing members of particular ethnic groups – than when 
 12 
fighting off non-ethnic PGMs when it is hard to identify regime supporters.53 This results in 
lower battlefield lethality. Hence, we arrive at our following hypothesis, namely: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Civil wars involving co-ethnic militias are less likely to have 
higher lethality than conflicts with non-ethnic militias. 
 
Data and Variables  
 
We use Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) definition of civil war as an incompatibility 
over government or territory that leads to a minimum of 25 battle-deaths in a calendar year 
and occurs between a government and one or more armed non-state groups.54 Battlefield 
lethality is the dependent variable of this study. The data on battlefield fatalities is taken from 
the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths (BRD) Dataset v.5-2016 that contains data on battlefield 
deaths in all civil wars from 1989 to 2015. The data is organised as a conflict-year time-series 
dataset with each conflict year constituting a separate observation. As each country might 
have several conflicts involving PGMs raging simultaneously or during different time 
periods, each conflict is treated separately. Battlefield lethality is a count variable presenting 
a total number of battle-deaths in each conflict-year. The BRD measures conflict-related 
fatalities strictly in terms of battlefield deaths, which exclude civilian casualties (one-sided 
violence) and other non-battlefield related fatalities. 
Presence of pro-government militias is the main explanatory variable. It controls for the 
existence of militias in each conflict-year from 1989 until the end of conflict, or the last year 
of available data (2014), whichever comes first. For data on PGMs, we have relied on the 
UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (NSCD) v. 2.5-2015.55 NSCD is a cross-sectional dataset 
that contains data on non-state actors from 1946 to 2014. The dataset does not differentiate 
 13 
between militias and other armed groups, but employing our definition of PGMs (endnote 1) 
enabled us to identify a total of 84 intrastate conflicts with militia presence. NSCD records all 
armed non-state groups ‘neither of which is the government of a state’ involved in incidents 
of violence, ‘which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year’. In order to identify 
PGMs from other groups in the NSCD, we have relied on UCDP conflict database, which 
contains detailed descriptions of all armed groups. This data allowed us to determine whether 
a non-state group is pro- or anti-government. All pro-government armed non-state groups 
were coded as PGMs. PGM presence was coded as dummy controlling for whether at least 
one militia group was present in each conflict-year of BRD.56 In order to identify ethnic 
identity of each militia group, we have relied on the Dangerous Companions Project57 which 
offers data on ethnic composition of all armed groups active between 1945 and 2015. 
Following the data on ethnic membership of each PGM we were able to split all militias into 
two generic categories of co-ethnic and non-ethnic PGMs. Co-ethnic militias are PGMs 
recruited from the same ethnic group(s) as rebels. Whereas non-ethnic militias are PGMs 
recruited from ethnic groups other than rebels’ constituency, or regardless of their ethnicity. 
To control for the presence of both types of militias in each conflict, we create co-ethnic and 
non-ethnic PGMs variable, which allows considering cases with multiple militia groups 
involved in one conflict episode.  
Bearing in mind that conflict lethality in intrastate conflicts involving militias might be 
associated with violence against civilian population, which we discuss in our theoretical 
sections on a number of occasions, we introduce a set of explanatory variables measuring 
civilian victimisation. Governments targeting civilians, rebels targeting civilians and militias 
targeting civilians are three dummies designed upon similar variables from Stanton.58 Each 
variable controls for the occurrence of violence against civilians committed by a certain type 
of conflict protagonists. According to Stanton’s59 terminology, civilian targeting includes 
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massacres, scorched earth campaigns, ethnic or religious cleansing, as well as purposeful 
bombing and shelling of civilian targets. Although one-sided violence is excluded from our 
definition of conflict lethality, intensity of violence against civilians has been rehearsed in the 
literature as a factor contributing to the overall conflict intensity.60  
We also include a number of control variables in order to account for factors that might 
influence militia impact on battlefield lethality. Since each of our hypotheses is embedded in 
conflict context, accounting for various characteristics of conflicts enables to understand why 
a particular outcome is possible. To start with, a variable for duration was designed as a count 
of conflict years. Accounting for duration allows us to estimate whether longer conflicts are 
likely to be more lethal.61 Duration is also critical for our statistical models as battle lethality 
levels fluctuate throughout the duration of many conflict episodes. Although survival analysis 
captures duration, we added a separate duration variable as an extra control for the 
significance of duration. To differentiate between ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts we adopt 
Ethnic conflict dummy modelled on Fearon and Laitin’s62 ethnic wars variable. This variable 
categorises civil wars as non-ethnic (1), mixed (2) and ethnic (3) intrastate conflicts. We 
define a conflict as ethnic if two or more ethnic groups are involved in a confrontation where 
the government and rebels belong to different ethnic groups. There are 26 non-ethnic and 58 
ethnic conflicts in our dataset. Bearing in mind the central role of ethnicity for this study, 
controlling for ethnic conflicts is important for establishing whether conflict typology, such 
as differences between identity-based and ideological conflicts affect the dynamics of militia 
relationship with conflict severity. To further explore the role of ethnicity, we add a 
percentage log of country’s ethnic fragmentation.63 This variable controls for ethnically 
excluded population allowing to account for the effect of ethnic diversity on the relationship 
between dependent and outcome variables. Political regime type is coded on the basis of 
Polity IV as a count for democracies (10), autocracies (-10) and all other regimes in-between 
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these two base categories. Controlling for regime types enables us to explain as to whether 
militia ethnicity associates with conflict lethality in more (or less) liberal regimes. A log of 
the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in current US dollars is constructed from 
the World Bank Database in order to account whether the level of economic development has 
an effect on conflict lethality. Another variable based on the World Bank data is a log of 
population size. We introduce this variable to control for variation between countries with 
larger and smaller populations as population size is commonly used in research to conflict 
severity.64 Lastly, we add a percentage of mountainous terrain of each country’s territory 
taken from Fearon and Laitin65 in order to control for geographical characteristics and 
whether they have an effect on conflict lethality.     
 
Empirical findings  
 
We employ Cox proportional hazards models to control for transition from low to high 
battlefield lethality.66 UCDP’s threshold of transition from low-intensity conflict to major 
war, measured in 999 battle-deaths, was used as a point of transformation from low to high 
lethality. We choose a semiparametric model because it allows to work with right-censored 
observations more effectively than parametric models. Each conflict-year is treated as 
potentially at risk of intensifying from low to high lethality rates. Each conflict remains in the 
risk set until it reaches 999 battle-deaths threshold. Some civil wars that start as high lethality 
conflicts, with over 999 battlefield fatalities during their first year, transform into less lethal 
conflicts at later stages. For active conflicts, transition remains unobserved after 2014, 
therefore, these events become censored. For numerous civil wars, battlefield fatalities float 
throughout the course of conflict without ever reaching a threshold point of 999 battle-deaths 
per year. All of the above makes it difficult to establish clear-cut theoretical expectations of a 
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hazard rate, required for parametric models. Bearing in mind temporal character of battlefield 
lethality, Cox model allows to capture time-dependency, which would remain unobserved in 
probit and logit models, as well as negative binomial models with a count variable. Indeed, in 
multiple conflict episodes levels of battlefield lethality are constantly changing from one year 
to another, which makes the choice of survival analysis model rather intuitive. 
Table 1 shows the results of Cox proportional hazards models. In Models 1 and 2, we 
test the presence of non-ethnic (Model 1) and co-ethnic (Model 2) PGMs for their likelihood 
of increasing the risk of higher battlefield lethality. In Model 3, we control for cases where 
both types of militias are present.  
 
<Table 1.> 
 
Our first hypothesis posited that civil wars involving non-ethnic militias tend to be more 
lethal in terms of battlefield deaths. Model 1 reports findings pertaining to non-ethnic groups 
and shows that hazard ratios for the PGM variable indicate nearly 70% risk of higher lethality 
(significant at .05) in conflicts with non-ethnic militias present. Descriptive statistics 
demonstrate that civil wars with non-ethnic militias involved include such high lethality wars 
as the Colombian and Iraqi conflicts, as well as ongoing Libyan and Syrian civil wars, each 
of which well exceeds 1,000 battle-deaths per year threshold.67  
Employing the original BRD v.5-2016, we have also counted the average battle-deaths 
in non-ethnic conflicts with no militia presence, confirming that such conflicts produce on 
average over 700 battle-deaths per year, as opposed to over 2,000 in conflicts with militia 
presence.68 Although still very casualty-intensive, non-ethnic conflicts without militias 
nevertheless fail to reach a 999 deaths threshold. This indicates that non-ethnic militias are 
not a characteristic of high lethality conflicts, but rather a likely cause of higher battle-deaths. 
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To visualise our findings pertaining to H1, we plotted the Cox model in Table 1 using 
Kaplan-Meyer survivor function. Results presented in Figure 1, show that conflict episodes 
involving non-ethnic PGMs are several times more likely to cause higher battlefield lethality 
than conflicts with no non-ethnic militias engaged. 
 
<Figure 1.>           
 
We turn to Model 2. Hazard ratios of co-ethnic militias are both negative and not 
statistically significant. Descriptive statistics indicate that average battlefield lethality in 
conflicts with co-ethnic militias is almost four times lower than in episodes with non-ethnic 
PGMs (under 10,000 deaths per year). Comparing models with and without co-ethnic PGMs, 
an alternative model tested without co-ethnic PGM presence produces lower AIC69, 
suggesting that adding co-ethnic PGMs does not make for a better model. 
Both hypotheses were framed in order to offer a tentative answer as to why non-ethnic 
PGMs are more conducive to high lethality. Amongst other factors, we proposed that non-
ethnic militias are more likely to increase conflict lethality owing to their tendency of 
targeting civilians. In all three models, variable of militia targeting civilians is in positive 
direction, but it only has significance in Model 1 for non-ethnic militias. Government 
targeting civilians emerges as positive and significant in model for mixed PGMs, and rebels 
targeting of civilians remains negative and highly significant in all models. A detailed look at 
the data helps us to provide some explanations for these findings. In 51% of observations, 
non-ethnic militias engaged in targeting civilians. This number is lower than rebel civilian 
targeting (68%), but higher than government civilian targeting (41%). However, combining 
government and PGM targeting of civilians, and bearing in mind that on many occasions 
militias persecute civilians on behalf of the incumbent,70 we discover that pro-regime forces 
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tended to target civilians in over 90% of cases in episodes involving non-ethnic conflicts. 
With such markedly high percentage of pro-regime civilian targeting, our earlier assumption 
that rebels are forced to intensify violence in order to protect (secure) their civilian support 
bases, therefore, both inflicting higher fatalities on the incumbent and suffering casualties of 
their own, becomes more empirically sound. By contrast, co-ethnic PGMs engaged in civilian 
targeting in 34% of cases. In conflicts with ethnic PGMs, rebels targeted civilians in 60% of 
observations and governments in 68%. Seemingly, co-ethnic pro-regime forces conducted a 
slightly higher degree of civilian persecution than non-ethnic militias.  
The difference between two types of conflict episodes appears to be in the degree of 
militia persecution of civilians. Whilst in conflicts involving co-ethnic PGMs governments 
seem to be more willing to directly engage in targeting civilians, in conflicts with non-ethnic 
militias, PGMs takeover civilian persecution roles. To better understand the association 
between PGM targeting of civilians and the increase of battlefield lethality in non-ethnic 
conflicts we analysed total numbers of civilian casualties in both types of conflicts. We found 
that in conflicts with non-ethnic militia participation, rebels have claimed almost three times 
more civilian lives than governments.71 These numbers are in completely opposite direction 
for conflicts with co-ethnic PGMs, where governments assassinated nearly five times more 
civilians than rebels. Keeping in mind that militia civilian victims are included in the number 
of civilians murdered by governments, the number of militia (as part of government forces) 
civilian victims in conflicts with non-ethnic PGMs is actually not too high relative to the 
frequency of pro-regime forces targeting civilians. One way to interpret these findings is to 
assume that high rates of government and militia attacks on civilians result in relatively low 
numbers of civilian fatalities due to pro-regime forces desire to intimidate civilians rather 
than to massacre them.72 These acts in turn induce rebels to retaliate by attacking both 
(suspected) pro-regime civilians and armed forces. As rebels typically have lower capacity 
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and less resources to use non-lethal violence, such as detention and mass torture, their 
violence against civilians is more lethal.      
Controlling for presence of both types of PGMs in one conflict episode, produced 
negative results (significant at .001). This suggests that when both co-ethnic and non-ethnic 
militias are involved, conflict lethality is not very likely to increase. The other possible 
explanation of that finding is that negative outcome is driven by a relatively small number of 
cases (less than 8%) when two types of PGMs are present in the same conflict episode.   
As for controls, conflict duration produces about 70% of risk of higher lethality in all 
models. Hence, longer conflicts are clearly to be more lethal with either type of PGMs 
engaged. Ethnicity variables appear either irrelevant or negative in all three models. Political 
regime type, population size and the terrain roughness largely remain insignificant and 
negative. Economic performance is in expected negative and highly statistically significant 
direction, suggesting that well-developed economies are not likely to use militia services in 
armed conflicts.  
To explore whether the distribution of hazard rate differs in parametric models, we 
tested the same set of models with Weibull and exponential distribution models. Both 
methods produced results identical to Cox proportional hazards models, with all variables 
behaving in the same manner as in semiparametric models.73  
 
<Table 2.> 
 
Assuming that time-dependency is not crucial for the analysis, we tested all three models 
using logistic regression models. We run regressions using a log of all battle-deaths 
exceeding 999 deaths threshold for each conflict-year. The logistic regression analysis 
yielded results similar to the survival analyses tests (see Table 2). Coefficients of PGM 
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presence in Model 1 (non-ethnic) are in positive direction and are statistically significant (at 
.01). Co-ethnic PGMs’ coefficients are negative as well as results for both types of militias. 
Notable differences between Cox regressions and logit models are in findings related to 
conflict duration, which is negative and insignificant in logit models, and ethnic 
fragmentation which appears highly important in logit results. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This study has sought to explain whether ethnicity of conflict actors affects battlefield 
lethality in intrastate wars. We have argued that due to intricate relationship between one-
sided violence and participation of pro-government proxies in civil wars, ethnicity plays a 
significant role in militias’ contribution to conflict lethality. Whilst we avoided directly 
exploring as to whether co-ethnic and non-ethnic PGMs cause more casualties amongst 
civilian population, we suggested that militias’ use of violence against civilians affects 
overall battlefield lethality. Bearing in mind that one-sided violence has been one of the 
causes responsible for conflict escalation processes, it is intuitive to hypothesise that the 
involvement of extra-state agents notorious for civilian persecution is likely to contribute to 
battlefield lethality. Although militias are not always directly deployed in action and, in many 
conflicts are not designed for combat missions, in their respective roles they are still 
potentially conducive to higher conflict lethality.   
Our empirical findings suggest that different levels of one-sided violence employed by 
co-ethnic and non-ethnic PGMs are likely to have different effect on conflict severity. Less 
violent towards civilians, co-ethnic militias seem to create less opportunities for conflict 
escalation or higher lethality amongst the belligerents, than non-ethnic PGMs. By contrast, 
non-ethnic militias are well-known for their inclination to target civilians. Since few modern 
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conflicts occur in a vacuum, one-sided violence is likely to resonate either in retributive 
attacks by rebels, or in international intervention or increased international support for regime 
opponents. Scholars have argued that incumbents delegate civilian persecution to PGMs in 
order to avoid responsibility, yet few if any regime opponents are able or willing to 
differentiate between the regime and its proxies. As cases from Colombia, Sudan, former 
Yugoslavia and Myanmar demonstrate, excessive one-sided violence by pro-regime forces 
almost always leads to conflict escalation. One particular lesson to be drawn from this study 
for future research and practice is that understanding ethnic makeup of conflict protagonists 
is crucial towards explaining the dynamics of violence in civil wars. It also emphasises the 
collateral impact of one-sided violence on battlefield lethality and that civilian persecution is 
closely interrelated with deaths on the battlefield.    
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the ground compared to ethnic PGMs. With non-ethnic PGMs being deployed against ethnically-
distinct areas, pre-conflict ties between members of ethnic communities from which non-ethnic PGMs 
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71  A total of 24,949 civilians were killed by rebels and there were 7,409 civilian victims of 
governments.  
72  Civilian targeting along with murder, includes rape, torture and detention. All these types of 
violence were widely practiced in many non-ethnic conflicts included in our dataset, such as civil 
wars in Libya, Syria, Philippines and Peru.  
73  Since hazard ratios of these models were identical to Cox models, the results are not reported.  
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Table 1. Cox proportional hazards models of PGM types and conflict lethality  
 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
 
Non-ethnic PGMs  
 
 
1.69* 
(2.38) 
 
 
 
Co-ethnic PGMs 
 
 0.71 
(-1.51) 
 
Co-ethnic and non-ethnic PGMs  
 
  0.15*** 
(-8.59) 
Government targeting civilians  1.38 
(1.62) 
1.47 
(1.95) 
1.47*                 
(1.97) 
Rebels targeting civilians  0.43*** 
(-4.40) 
0.41*** 
(-4.54) 
0.44***                  
(-4.36) 
Militias targeting civilians  1.54* 
(0.30) 
1.14 
(0.69) 
1.28                 
(0.16) 
Duration  
 
1.74*** 
(4.46) 
1.71*** 
(4.23) 
1.74***                   
(4.40) 
Ethnic conflict 
 
1.78 
(0.65) 
1.10 
(0.09) 
0.95                      
(-0.38)   
Ethnic fragmentation  
 
0.44* 
(-2.14) 
0.36** 
(-2.69) 
0.31***                  
(-3.32) 
Political regime type 
 
1.07 
(0.41) 
1.06 
(0.36) 
1.04                  
(0.21) 
Population size 
 
0.86* 
(-2.22) 
0.89 
(-1.72) 
0.88                   
(-1.84) 
GDP per capita 
 
0.77*** 
(-3.59) 
0.76*** 
(-3.84) 
0.76***                  
(-3.86) 
Mountainous terrain  
 
0.99 
(-1.33) 
 
0.99 
(-1.81) 
0.99*                 
(-2.13) 
Log likelihood  -903.264 -904.983 -906.144 
Number of observations 544  540 540 
Number of failures 218 217 217 
Time at risk 928466 925520 925520 
AIC 
 
1822.733 1826.144 1826.724 
Hazard ratios are presented. Robust z-statistics (clustered by conflict) are in parentheses.  
AIC – Akaike’s information criterion.  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Figure 1  
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Table 2. Logistic regression models 
 Model 1 
(non-ethnic) 
Model 2 
(co-ethnic) 
Model 3 
(Co-ethnic and  
non-ethnic) 
 
 
PGM presence  
 
 
1.045** 
(0.401) 
 
 
0.188 
(0.444) 
 
0.614 
(0.495) 
Government targeting civilians  
 
0.563 
(0.539) 
 
0.601 
(0.520) 
0.594 
(0.529) 
Rebels targeting civilians  
 
0.180 
(0.382) 
 
0.202 
(0.368) 
0.193 
(0.368) 
Militias targeting civilians  
 
0.891 
(0.465) 
 
0.880 
(0.468) 
0.900 
(0.465) 
Duration  
 
-0.954 
(0.386) 
 
0.118 
(0.376) 
0.110 
(0.377) 
Ethnic conflict 
 
-0.640 
(0.349) 
 
-0.799* 
(0.327) 
-0.787* 
(0.327) 
Ethnic fragmentation  
 
2.774** 
(0.917) 
 
2.640** 
(1.012) 
2.776** 
(0.987) 
Political regime type 
 
0.148*** 
(0.368) 
 
0.138*** 
(0.375) 
0.140*** 
(0.375) 
GDP per capita 
 
-0.567 
(0.139) 
 
-0.153 
(0.153) 
-0.156 
(0.156) 
Mountainous terrain  
 
 
0.853 
(0.877) 
0.360 
(0.880) 
0.427 
(0.862) 
Log likelihood  -117.949 -121.395 -121.395 
Number of observations 581 581 581 
Log ratio2  39.48 32.75 32.59 
Pseudo ratio2 
 
0.143 0.118 0.118 
Coefficients are presented. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Statistical significance at: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
